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I. INTRODUCTION

A. Perspective
Preoccupied with questions of the scope, availability, and timing
of judicial review of administrative agency decisions, legal scholars
have failed to conduct a systematic study of agency policymaking.'
Yet the increasingly important role of administrative agencies in government necessitates an informed judgment about the capability of
the administrative process to cope with an ever-wider variety of regulatory problems. This judgment is impossible without case studies of
the contributions of the agencies to the implementation of governmental policies. More information is needed about the pressures
shaping agency policymaking and about the influence of agency policy
on both coordinate policymakers and the regulated parties.
This Article examines the implementation of section 402 (a) (23)
of the 1967 amendments to the Social Security Act, which provided
a cost-of-living adjustment for recipients of Aid to Families with Def Associate Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin. B.S. 1960, J.D. 1963,
Ph.D. 1967, Northwestern University. Member, Illinois Bar.
The author wishes to thank Truman A. Morrison, III, of the University of Wisconsin Law School, class of 1970, for his assistance in researching this Article.
1 For a more detailed statement of the author's views, see Rabin, Book Review,
22 STAN. L. REv. 421 (1970). See also M. SHAPIRO, THE SUPREME COURT AND
ADmisnSRTmW AGENCIES 104-09 (1968).
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pendent Children (AFDC).' This originally obscure provision produced a controversy raising broad questions about the responsiveness
of Congress, the federal courts, and the federal executive agencies to
grievances articulated before them. In particular, this Article focuses
on the role played by the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare (HEW), the agency charged with implementing the AFDC
program.
B. The AFDC Program
One of four categorical aid programs under the Social Security
Act, AFDC provides funds to states
[f]or the purpose of encouraging the care of dependent children in their own homes or in the homes of relatives by
enabling each State to furnish financial assistance . . . as far

as practicable under the conditions in such State, to needy
dependent children and the parents or relatives with whom
they are living to help maintain and strengthen family
life . . . .
The amount of funds provided by the federal government is determined
by a formula reimbursing the state for five-sixths of the first eighteen
dollars plus roughly fifty percent of the next fourteen dollars in benefits
per recipient-the latter percentage varying according to the ratio of
4
state per capita income to national per capita income.
Although optional, a state's participation in the program obligates
it to satisfy certain requirements or risk termination of federal funding.- The state must define the standard of need applicable to AFDC
242 U.S.C. § 602 (a) (23) (Supp. IV, 1969). The provision is set out in the text
accompanying note 8 infra. Note that § 402 in the 1967 amendments became § 602 in
the codification. References in text are to § 402.
342 U.S.C. § 601 (1964). The other three categorical programs are Old Age
Assistance (OAA), Aid to the Blind (AB), and Aid for the Permanently and Totally
Disabled (APTD).
4The formula is set out in 42 U.S.C. §603(a) (1964), as amended, (Supp. IV,
1969). For the federal share of the second-tier benefits, see 42 U.S.C. § 623(b) (Supp.
IV, 1969).
542 U.S.C. § 604(a) (1964), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1969) provides:
In the case of any State plan for aid and services to needy families with
children which has been approved by the Secretary, if the Secretary, after
reasonable notice and opportunity for hearing to the State agency administering or supervising the administration of such plan, finds(2) that in the administration of the plan there is a failure to
comply substantially with any provision required by section 602(a)
...
to be included in the plan;
the Secretary shall notify such State agency that further payments will not
be made to the State ... until the Secretary is satisfied that ... there is no
longer any such failure to comply.
The requirements are set out in 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1964), as amended, (Supp. IV,
1969). Section 602(a) (23) is the most recent provision. Earlier provisions relate to
such matters as fair hearings for individuals denied AFDC benefits, uniformity in the
administration of state plans, and effective provision of services.
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recipients by constructing a budget of items necessary for basic subsistence and then totaling their cost.6 Yet because the federal government allows the state to determine the pricing of the budgetary items
and does not require it to set the level of AFDC benefits in accord
with the standard of need, the participating state effectively controls the
amount of aid paid to recipients.
The states have adopted several basic methods for computing
benefit levels. The simplest method is payment of 100 percent of need.
Other states apply a variation of this method and set benefit levels at
a specified percentage of the standard of need, a practice commonly
referred to as the percentage reduction or ratable reduction system.
A second commonly used method of computing benefits employs
a family maximum. The benefits to the family unit increase as the
number of family members increases, until a certain level of payments
is reached; thereafter the payment is the same regardless of the size
of the family. The amount of benefits per individual thus declines as
families become larger.
Finally, some states use a system of flat grants. One typical
variation of this system ignores the relationship of need to age variations among the members of different families and pays a flat sum to
every family of a given size.
Once a state finishes calculating its allocation for the AFDC
program, application of the "matching fund" formula determines the
federal contribution. As might be expected, tremendous variation in
benefit levels exists among the states. The average monthly benefits
in July 1969 ranged from a low of $10.55 per recipient in Mississippi
7
to a high of $64.65 per recipient in New Jersey.
C. Section 402 (a) (23)
On January 2, 1968, Congress enacted section 402(a) (23).
[B]y July 1, 1969, the amounts used by the State to determine the needs of individuals will have been adjusted to reflect
fully changes in living costs since such amounts were established, and any maximums that the State imposes on the
amount of aid paid to families will have been proportionately
adjusted.'
0 Section 602 (a) does not expressly require a state
need, but several of its requirements presume that it will
§§602(a) (7), (8), (23) (Supp. IV, 1969). Regulations
[s]pecify a State-wide standard, expressed in money
determining (a) the need of applicants and recipients
the assistance payment.

45 C.F.R. §233.20(a) (2) (i)

to designate a standard of
do so. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.
do require that a state plan
amounts, to be used in
and (b) the amount of

(1970).

'I Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, appendix B, at 26-27, Rosado v.
Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970).

842 U.S.C. § 602(a) (23) (Supp. IV, 1969).
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The effective date of the statute meant that the states had eighteen
months in which to comply with the provision, and HEW had eighteen
months in which to seek their compliance.
Welfare recipients hotly contested the meaning of section 402 (a)
(23) at the conference table with HEW and in the courts. The
dispute centered on the provision's ambiguity: Could the states adjust
only their standard of need to reflect increases in the cost of living,
or must they increase the amount of benefits paid as well? Beyond
this relatively straightforward question of statutory interpretation lay
a wide array of problems created by the diversity of state responses
to the provision. The performance of HEW and the courts in dealing
with these issues raises serious questions about the availability of an
effective forum for the articulation of the grievances of welfare recipients. These questions require a detailed exploration of the judicial
and administrative implementation of section 402 (a) (23), commencing
with an examination of the legislative history of the provision.
II. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY .
Among the amendments to the House bill 9 introduced before the
Senate Finance Committee was one sponsored by HEW that would
require state AFDC programs to
provide (i) effective July 1, 1969, for meeting . . . all the

need, as determined in accordance with the standards applicable under the plan for determining need, of eligible individuals . .

.

and (ii) effective July 1, 1968, for an annual

review of such standards and (to the extent prescribed by the
Secretary) for updating such standards to take into account
changes in living costs."0
The earlier version of the bill approved by the House contained no
provision for changes in either standards of need or amounts of
benefits paid. Presumably HEW sought to remedy the failure of
most states to pay 100 percent of state-defined standards of need and
to increase the amounts of benefits commensurate with increases in
the cost of living." The suggested amendment satisfied both objec9 H.R. 12080, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).

10 Hearings on H.R. 12080 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 1, at 634-35 (1967).

" HEW's position at the Senate hearings was that
[p]resent law requires States to establish public assistance need standards but
does not require that payments meet the need in full. Our amendments would:
(1) require States to meet full need as reflected in their own standards; ...
(3) require the standards to be at least as high as they were in January 1967;

(4) require standards to be updated on July 1, 1968, and reviewed annually
and modified with significant changes in the cost of living.

Id. 716.
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tives,' but was inconsistent with the tradition of absolute state discretion in setting benefit levels; indeed, it limited state discretion to
the initial pricing of budgetary items for the standard of need.
The amendment did not find its way into the Senate bill. Rather,
the Senate Report on the 1967 Social Security Amendments described
section 402 (a) (23) as requiring
that by July 1, 1969, and at least annually thereafter, the
amount used by the State to determine the needs of individuals
will be adjusted to reflect fully changes in living costs since
such amounts were established, and that any maximums that
the State imposes on the amount of aid paid to families will
be proportionately adjusted. 3
The language in the Senate Report closely resembles that in section
402 (a) (23) as enacted, except that an annual adjustment of the
standard of need and maximums on benefits is contemplated. The
elimination from the HEW-sponsored amendment of the requirement
to pay all need may evidence the Senate's unwillingness to require the
states to raise benefits to a federally prescribed level. But the question
whether section 402 (a) (23) requires any increase in benefits remains
unanswered. Certainly the retention of an annual adjustment for
"any maximums . . . on the amount of aid paid" is consistent with
an intent to require increased benefits irrespective of the particular
method employed by a state to compute the standard of need or the
amount of benefits.
Section 402(a) (23) underwent one final change at the HouseSenate conference. The legislators agreed to require the states to
make only one increase in their standards of need and maximums on
benefits prior to July 1, 1969, and dropped the provision requiring
annual revisions."4 They left the language of the Senate version otherwise untouched.
Much subsequent litigation involving section 402 (a) (23) focused
on determining what Congress meant by the requirement that "any
maximums that the State imposes on the amount of aid paid to families
[be] proportionately adjusted." As is discussed below, the contesting
parties relied primarily upon inference rather than upon direct evidence
of legislative intent, for scarcely any direct reference was made to the
'Note, however, that the cost-of-living adjustment was not made mandatory.
Standards were to be updated only "to the extent prescribed by the Secretary." Text
accompanying note 10 supra. The final Senate version of the bill required annual
cost-of-living adjustments. Text accompanying note 13 infra.
13 S.REP. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), in 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.

NEWs 3133 (1967).
14 Id. 3180.
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language of section 402 (a) (23) during the entire course of the legislative hearings and debate-other than mere reiteration of the provision's language. Consequently, the most forceful argument for
interpreting section 402 (a) (23) to require increases in the amounts
of benefits took the "common sense" position that Congress would not
provide a purely paper increase-an increase solely in standards of
need-and leave optional an increase in the amounts of benefits. Yet
the most forceful argument for a more restrictive interpretation-an
equally "common sense" stance-was that Congress would not abandon,
at least not without debate, its traditional policy of allowing the states
to set benefit levels, especially when the change would require a sizable
increase in state budgetary allotments for an unpopular program.
Either of these interpretations is tenable if recourse is limited to
inferences drawn from the provision's language31
Unnoticed or at least unmentioned by any of the litigants was one
direct exchange in the Senate over the meaning of section 402 (a) (23).
Debate on the bill-still including the proviso for annual adjustment
but otherwise trimmed down to the final language of section 402 (a)
(23)-was near completion. Senator McGovern offered an amendment to provide that
the standards used for determining the need of applicants and
recipients for and the extent of aid under the plan, and any
maximum on the amount of aid and other income will be no
less than $4 per month per individual . . . above such amount
of aid and other income available under the standards and
maximums applicable under the plan on December 31, 1966.16
To make clear his intent to increase benefits, the Senator apparently
felt compelled to refer specifically to increases in "the extent of aid
under the plan." This language was included in addition to a reference
to increases in "any maximum on the amount of aid"-a phrase similar
to the provision in the final version of section 402 (a) (23) that recipients in litigating read to require increased benefits.
More important than its language is the context in which the
McGovern amendment was put forth. Other amendments provided an
eleven percent increase in the amounts of benefits under the three other
categorical Social Security programs.' 7 The McGovern amendment
16

Text accompanying notes 24-30 infra.

16

113 CONG. REc. 33559 (1967).

The announced purpose of the amendment was

to guarantee an increase in the amounts of benefits payable under AFDC. Id. (remarks
of Senator Mansfield introducing the McGovern amendment).
17 See id. 33560 (statement of Senator McGovern). The amounts of benefits
payable under the other Social Security programs were to be adjusted by requiring
each State to adjust its standards for determining need, the extent of its aid
or assistance, and the maximum amount of the aid or assistance payable under
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meant to provide the same percentage adjustment for cost-of-living
changes-in dollar amounts-for AFDC recipients. The amendment's
rejection indicates that the Senate did not intend to increase the benefits
payable under the AFDC program. In the brief debate, Senator
Robert Kennedy referred specifically to the inadequacy of section 402
(a) (23) without the McGovern amendment:
As to dependent children on welfare, the bill provides only
that their welfare standards are to be repriced yearly in accordance with the cost of living. This amendment, moderate
as it is, would have required that the discrimination [between
AFDC and the other categorical programs] be erased only to
the extent of increasing payments for dependent children by
$4 a month.:'
Senator Kennedy thus argued that the amendment was necessary because he interpreted section 402 (a) (23) to require only an increase in
the standards of need. Supporting this interpretation is Senator Long's
complaint that the McGovern amendment required the states to increase
benefits without giving them the necessary funds.' 9 Obviously, the
same problem envisioned by Senator Long would also arise if section
402 (a) (23) alone were read to require increased benefits. But none
of the Senators in the debate so read the provision. Brief as it was,
the debate on the McGovern amendment is the strongest evidence of
Congress' intent in enacting section 402 (a) (23).
III. HEW's

INTERPRETATION

HEW issued its interpretation of section 402 (a) (23) on January
28, 1969, six months before the July 1 deadline, but one year after
the earliest possible date for state compliance. The Department's
regulation provided that:
By July 1, 1969, the State's standard of assistance for the
AFDC program will have been adjusted to reflect fully
changes in living costs since such standards were established,
and any maximums that the State imposes on the amount of
its plans ... so that the total aid or assistance and other income per recipient
will be no less than $7.50 per month above [existing benefit levels].
Id. 36360 (Conference Report) (emphasis added).
Section 402(a) (23) does not include the critical phrase requiring adjustment of
"the extent of [State] aid or assistance." Obviously had Congress intended § 402(a)
(23) to increase benefits payable to AFDC recipients, it could have included the language used to provide specific dollar increases for recipients in the other three categorical programs.
The $7.50 increase in benefits under titles I, X, & XIV ultimately failed to pass.
Instead Congress enacted a $2.50 increase in the $5.00 income disregard provision.
See id.
18 1d. 33560 (emphasis added).
19 Id.
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aid paid to families will have been proportionately adjusted.
In such adjustment a consolidation of the standard (i.e., combining of items) may not result in a reduction in the content
of the standard. In the event the State is not able to meet
need in full under the adjusted standard, the State may make
ratable reductions .

.

.

. Nevertheless, if a State maintains

a system of dollar maximums, these maximums must be proportionately adjusted in relation to the updated standards.
The critical language is that allowing the states to make ratable
reductions if unable to pay their adjusted standards of need. A state
paying 100 percent of need, but unwilling to pay additional dollar
benefits, could neutralize a mandatory cost-of-living increase of ten
percent in its need standard by henceforth paying only ninety percent
of need. Or it could even reduce the total amount of dollar benefits
by paying only fifty percent of need." Similarly, a state employing a
family maximum method of computing payments could avoid the required cost-of-living increase in benefits by adopting a percentage reduction system set at the level necessary to yield no more in dollar
benefits than had the previous family maximum system.
An even broader interpretation of the regulation is possible. After
instituting a "flat grant" system imposing neither maximums nor a
percentage reduction, New York contended that only a method of computing benefits that imposed "maximums" had to be proportionately
adjusted to the increased standard of need.'
HEW's regulation took a firm stand on the question whether
section 402 (a) (23) required increased benefits-it not only answered
in the negative but also suggested how states unfortunate enough to
be employing maximums could avoid any increase. But HEW's constituency is presumably the welfare recipients; certainly the various
obligations imposed on states participating in the AFDC programobligations to be enforced by HEW-are intended to protect and benefit the recipients.3 Why did HEW choose to read section 402 (a) (23)
contrary to the interest of the recipients? Is the provision sufficiently
ambiguous so that it could have as easily been read to the benefit of
the recipients as to their detriment?
20 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a) (2) (ii) (1970).
21 Some states found their welfare rolls enlarged after the Supreme Court in
King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968), struck down the man-in-the-house rule. This
was the cause of Louisiana's welfare cuts which led to Lampton v. Bonin, 299 F. Supp.
336 (E.D. La. 1969), vacated & remanded, 397 U.S. 663 (1970) (discussed at text
accompanying notes 50-56 infra).
22 Text accompanying notes 57-60 infra; see Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae at 5-9, Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
23 Section 402(a) (23) contains the last in a series of 23 requirements imposed on
the states as conditions for the continuation of federal funding. The obligations, primarily intended to guarantee fair treatment of all persons eligible to receive welfare
benefits, are set out in 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1964), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1969).
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HEW spelled out its position in its amicus brief in Jefferson v.
Hackey 4 After suggesting that the term "maximums" is traditionally used as a term of art to refer to a method of computing benefits
which imposes dollar maximums," HEW argued that the language of
section 402 (a) (23) requiring a "proportionate adjustment" in maximums makes no sense applied to a percentage reduction system, because dollar benefits in a state paying a percentage of need will be
automatically increased by any upward adjustment in the standard of
need 2
Although plausible, this argument implies that Congress meant to
require increases in the amounts of benefits only in states employing
family maximum systems. The only explanation for this discrimination
is that Congress thereby intended to discourage states from employing
a system of family maximums. Yet Congress would be unlikely to
attempt to reach this result by such an indirect route and without a
word of explanation.
HEW also contended that Congress did not intend to impose
upon the states the heavy financial burden necessarily resulting from
a required increase in the amount of benefits. As the legislative history
shows, Congress was unwilling to enact an increase of four dollars per
month per recipient on the ground that it would cost the states too
much. 7 Of course, the Senate's unwillingness to accept a specific
dollar increase in the amount of benefits does not necessarily mean that
it was similarly opposed to a less visible, automatic increase tied to
the rising cost of living. But in an inflationary economy a moneyconscious Senate would be unlikely to approve silently even an automatic cost-of-living increase when it would require millions of dollars
of increased state funding for a politically unpopular program.
Although compelling, this argument reduces section 402 (a) (23)
to insignificance, for it implies that Congress enacted the provision
merely to secure a paper increase in standards of need."8
24304 F. Supp. 1332 (N.D. Tex. 1969), vacated & remanded, 397 U.S. 821 (1970)
(discussed at text accompanying note 63 infra).
2 Brief for HEW as Amicus Curiae at 6-8, Jefferson v. Hackney, 304 F. Supp.

1332 (N.D. Tex. 1969).
201d. 8.
2Id.
8-11.
28

The increase makes additional persons eligible for payments because families
with incomes sufficient under the old standard of need would be unable to meet the
budget set up under the new standard. But nothing in the legislative history suggests
that § 402(a) (23) was meant to place more families on the AFDC rolls. Further, in
states allocating a fixed sum for the AFDC program, increases in the number of
families of recipients must result in decreases in the benefits for families already
receiving AFDC. A paper increase in need standards would thus help additional
families only at the expense of those already receiving benefits, unless additional funds
were supplied.
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Finally, HEW contended that if the statute required increased
benefits it would be inconsistent with the tradition of reserving to the
states absolute discretion to set benefit levels.2 9 Yet any encroachment
on traditional state prerogatives is minimal, suspending state discretion
only to require one cost-of-living adjustment in state-prescribed benefit
levels.
Ignoring Senator Kennedy's direct reference to section 402(a)
(23)-since HEW evidently failed to pick up this telling piece of
evidence-equally valid arguments support either interpretation of the
statute. Congress did not make clear its purpose in adopting section
402 (a) (23), and HEW's restrictive interpretation of the provision
reveals more about HEW than about the meaning of the statute.
HEW's reading of the legislative history suggests that it viewed the
states, rather than the welfare recipients, as its constituency. This
conclusion is supported by concrete evidence drawn from the negotiations over section 402 (a) (23) between HEW and AFDC recipients
represented by the National Welfare Rights Organization (NWRO).' °

IV. HEW-NWRO

NEGOTIATIONS

Early in the Nixon administration, HEW and NWRO agreed
that a variety of enforcement problems resulted from the failure of the
states to adhere to requirements of the AFDC program,3 1 and HEW
assented to meet frequently with NWRO to discuss means of achieving
stricter compliance with the federal rules and regulations. The agency
purported to view these meetings as a way of giving AFDC recipients
a measure of access to the welfare administrators. By June 1969,
29 Brief for HEW as Amicus Curiae at 11, Jefferson v. Hackney, 304 F. Supp.
1332 (N.D. Tex. 1969).
30 The National Welfare Rights Organization is the central office for the local
welfare rights organizations of AFDC recipients. The local groups are basically concerned with organizing to protect the rights and represent the interests of AFDC
recipients. The national organization assists the local groups in organizing, provides
technical legal expertise, and supplies information about developments in the welfare
area. In addition, it acts as a spokesman for the local WRO's before Congress and
at HEW. In this role of spokesman, NWRO became deeply involved in the implementation of § 402(a) (23).
During the summer of 1969, the author and two University of Wisconsin law
students worked for NWRO on a variety of welfare law issues. The following discussion of the HEW-NWRO negotiations is based upon personal observation. Of
course, the author's conclusions do not necessarily reflect the viewpoint of NWRO or
any other participant in the negotiations.
31 On February 25, the Executive Committee of NWRO met with Secretary of
HEW Robert Finch to discuss problems of welfare abuse by state and local officials.
At that time the Secretary indicated that he was concerned about the problem
of local and state officials disobeying federal law relating to federally financed
programs and that he recognized limitations in HEW's ability to remedy this
problem. He agreed that there were ways in which poor people could augment
the federal effort to enforce the law.
Letter from George Wiley, Exec. Dir. of NWRO, to John Veneman, Undersec'y of
HEW, Mar. 18, 1969.
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meetings were taking place approximately every two weeks and continued on that basis throughout the summer.3 2
From the outset, NWRO expressed concern that the states would
not implement section 402 (a) (23), even on HEW's limited terms.3 3
NWRO believed that compliance on any terms was far better than no
compliance at all: first, because some states might raise benefit levels
if required to act; 34 second, because states employing maximums would
be compelled to increase the amounts of benefits unless they changed
systems; and third, because states cutting benefits would open themselves to legal and political attack. Thus, rather than questioning
HEW's interpretation of section 402 (a) (23), NWRO attempted to
persuade the agency to prod the states into action. The issue of
interpretation was left to the courts.
July 1, 1969, was the deadline for effectuating the cost-of-living
increase. At the meetings early in the spring and in June 1969, NWRO
repeatedly urged HEW to pressure the states to comply by July 1.
HEW responded that the states were aware of the deadline and it
assumed that they would act appropriately. But HEW did not reveal
its plans if this assumption proved inaccurate.35
The philosophy of "treading softly" exercised a pervasive influence
over HEW's approach to the state compliance problem. HEW repeatedly told NWRO that to impose sanctions for state inaction was
against both HEW's and NWRO's interests, for the only available
sanction was the termination of federal funding, which meant the
termination of payments to AFDC recipients.3 6 Heavy-handed efforts
to secure compliance might even cause a state to drop its AFDC program.17 HEW thus concluded that cooperation and negotiation with
the states was the only feasible alternative.
32The General Counsel of NWRO and the Commissioner of the Assistance Payments Administration of HEW's Social and Rehabilitative Service regularly attended
the meetings. There was a special meeting with Undersecretary Veneman to discuss
§ 402 (a) (23). The meetings generally lasted three to four hours and dealt with the
enforcement problems raised by NWRO. Section 402(a) (23) almost always dominated the agenda.
33 NWRO did not accept HEW's regulation as the definitive interpretation of
§402(a) (23), but HEW regarded the issue as closed, at least until the courts interpreted the provision.
34An upward adjustment of standards of need automatically increased the
amounts of benefits in states paying a percentage of need. Text accompanying note 26
sup ra. Such states had to act affirmatively to maintain or reduce benefit levels.
35 At the beginning of June, HEW furnished NWRO with several reports describing the action certain states had taken in response to § 402(a) (23). Only a few states
had submitted sufficient data for evaluation. Until the end of July, HEW consistently
asserted that adequate data from the remaining states would shortly be forthcoming.
3642 U.S.C. § 604(a) (1964), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1969).
37 As indicated earlier, state participation in the AFDC program is optional. Text
accompanying note 5 =pra.
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NWRO responded that the conformity hearing leading to the
termination of federal funding, although the only procedure specified
by statute, was not the exclusive means of enforcement. HEW could
employ lesser sanctions. For example, NWRO suggested that, upon
a complaint tendered by a sufficient number of aggrieved recipients,
HEW hold a public hearing that could result in a finding of noncompliance against a delinquent state. In effect a federal citation that
the state was disobeying the law,3" the finding would publicize the
state's nonconformity and help the recipients to organize themselves
to oppose it. A state might then comply without the further necessity
of a formal conformity hearing. But this and other suggestions never
9
received serious consideration.
HEW's timidity yielded predictable results. At a meeting with
NWRO shortly after the July 1 deadline, HEW was unable to disclose
whether the majority of states had complied with section 402 (a) (23)."0
Three weeks later, on July 25, HEW issued a document entitled State
Plans Which Do Not Meet FederalRequirements on Updating AFDC
Assistance Standards, listing thirty-nine states which had failed to
comply on HEW's terms.'
Soon thereafter NWRO inquired about the states not listed by
HEW as failing to comply as of July 25.'
Specifically, NWRO desired to know what criteria HEW employed in deciding whether
standards of need had been properly adjusted to compensate for the
38

Wiley Letter, supra note 31.

39 The public hearing proposal was advanced at various times during the summer
meetings. NWRO also proposed that specific unresolved grievances be recorded for
informal three-party meetings, to be attended by representatives of HEW, NWRO,
and the state involved. Neither of these proposals resulted in concrete action.
40 A law student working for NWRO began contacting welfare attorneys in each
state in June 1969 both for information and litigation purposes. As a result, at the
July 9 meeting NWRO was able to list six specific instances of state violation of
§ 402(a) (23) on HEW's terms. HEW responded that it could not verify the charges,
as its regional offices had not yet forwarded cost data from the states in question.
41 In a supplementary document, dated July 31, 1969, HEW broke down the noncompliance problems as follows:
Plans not yet submitted but updating completed ................... 14 states
Updating still in process or not started ........................... 8 states
Plans submitted but presents compliance questions ................ 10 states
Plans submitted but regional review incomplete ................... 9 states

Total ............................................... . 41 states
U.S.

DEP'T OF HEALTH, Enuc. & WELFARE, STATUS OF COMPLIANCE WITH SELECTED
PLAN REQUIREMENTS (1969). Thus 41 states had failed to satisfy HEW's terms as

of July 31. Moreover, no less than 31 states had either failed to submit plan materials
or submitted materials so late that evaluation was incomplete a month after the
effective date.
42 NWRO's information indicated that 6 states not listed among the 39 in the
July 25 document clearly appeared to be noncomplying on HEW's terms. In addition,
the list of noncomplying states included some with plans which the HEW regional
office preliminarily indicated would probably be "approvable," but the plans appeared
to NWRO to be clearly in violation of HEW's terms.
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rise in the cost of living. HEW assured NWRO that a memorandum
elaborating the section 402 (a) (23) requirements would soon be available. But not until October 17, 1969, three and one-half months after
the effective date of section 402 (a) (23), was that memorandum sent
to the states. It detailed the six cost study methods deemed most
appropriate by HEW,3 but permitted any "different method which is
identifiable, equitable and objective." This last proviso, together with
the Department's general attitude toward sanctions, leaves grave doubt
that HEW intended any check on absolute state discretion even at
that late date.
An earlier draft of this memorandum warned laggard states that
full compliance with section 402 (a) (23) required any post-July 1
adjustments raising benefit levels to be retroactive to July 1.' When
two cases raising this very point were brought to HEW's attention,
however, the official excuse for inaction was that the statute allowed
only prospective termination of federal funding."
HEW never adequately explained why the prospective termination of funding must
necessarily be limited to prospective acts of nonconformity. 4

A policy

forgiving past violations certainly encourages states to delay complying
with federal requirements. Significantly, the October 17 memorandum
omitted the earlier draft's directive requiring retroactive payments.
The major problem remained HEW's reluctance to take action
against the thirty-nine states that had failed to submit acceptable
plans.4
Four states were selected which both HEW and NWRO
43 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUc. & WELFARE, UPDATING STATE'S STANDARD OF
ASSISTANCE IN AFDC-INTERPREATON OF SOCIAL SECURITY ACT, SECTION 402(a)
(23) AND 45 C.F.R. 233.20(a) (2) (ii) . . . (Oct. 17, 1969).
44
This earlier version of the memorandum sent to the states is dated August 13,
more than 6 weeks after the operative date of § 402(a) (23). U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH,
EDUC. & WELFARE, UPDATING STATE'S STANDARD OF ASSISTANCE IN AFDC-INmRPE ETATIOI OF SOCIAL SECURITY Act, SECTION 402(a) (23) AND 45 C.F.R. 233.20(a)

(2) (ii) . . . (Aug. 13, 1969).

The earlier draft read as follows:

States which did not make the adjustments by July 1, 1969, have asked what

action is necessary to carry out section 402(a) (23) fully. To accomplish this,
such States would have to correct underpayments retroactively to July 1, 1969.

Other States have pointed out that they cannot make the necessary adjustments until the next redetermination of eligibility and have asked whether this
is permissible. This is acceptable only if underpayments are corrected retroactively to July 1, 1969, at the time of redetermination.
45 42 U.S.C. § 604(a) (1964), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1969).
46 Section 604(a) provides for the termination of funding "until the Secretary is
satisfied that such prohibited requirement is no longer so imposed, and that there is
no longer any such failure to comply." HEW appeared to argue that once a state met
the terms of § 402(a) (23) a "prohibited requirement is no longer so imposed." But
this argument ignores the conjunctive clause specifying "that there [be] no longer any
such failure to comply." Surely ignoring a statutorily prescribed increase in benefits
is a "failure to comply," even if the state later takes nonretroactive action.

47 HEW's July 31 tally showed that 41 states had failed to comply with § 402(a)
(23) as of that date-two more than the July 25 compilation showed. Twenty-two

states had failed even to submit the required data.

Note 41 mzepra.
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agreed were nonconforming. 48 When pressed to take action, HEW
informed NWRO that it was considering conformity hearings against
violators of various provisions, including section 402 (a) (23). Subsequently, HEW announced the institution of hearings against two
states to review a variety of issues, but one conspicuous omission was
section 402(a) (23). Thus compliance with section 402(a) (23), even
on HEW's limited terms, was left to the states' initiative.
The negotiations in the administrative forum were far more subtle
than might have been expected. Access was no problem; indeed, HEW
appeared anxious to provide access at a fairly high official level on a
regular basis. The HEW-NWRO meetings were largely free of
rancor, recriminations, and polemics; the issues were discussed openly
and in depth, although often to an impasse. But HEW's self-perception
of powerlessness was an insurmountable limitation to the potential
efficacy of the negotiations. As indicated above, this self-perception
manifested itself in a consistently negative stance on every issue raised
by NWRO. 49 In effect, HEW's position was that of the states. From
the recipients' viewpoint, the negotiations were virtually meaningless
because HEW had nothing to offer; essentially, the administrators
were engaged not in implementing the law but in effectuating a delaying
action. AFDC recipients would have to seek effective legal recourse
elsewhere.
V. SECTION

402(a) (23) IN THE COURTS

Recipients sought judicial relief well before the July 1 deadline
for state compliance. Indeed, the pursuit of increases in the amounts
of benefits under section 402 (a) (23) proceeded simultaneously in the
administrative and judicial forums, with the adversaries attempting to
use any advances in the latter to their advantage in the former.
On April 15, 1969, a three-judge federal district court handed
down the first decision on section 402 (a) (23) in Lampton v. Bonin
(Lampton I).5 Louisiana had decided to reduce all its ADC (AFDC)
48 NWRO selected 4 of the most flagrant violators and arranged a special ad hoc
meeting with a subcommittee from HEW to discuss their nonconformity problems.
Both sides agreed that the 4 states had violated § 402 (a) (23).
49 HEW's negative attitude towards enforcement was not restricted to § 402(a)
(23). In January 1969, HEW proposed a regulation requiring a state to maintain
assistance to recipients during the fair hearing process for determining continued
eligibility. The regulation was to take effect on October 1, 1969, but pressure from
the states forced HEW to withdraw the regulation before the deadline.
To reduce unlawful delay, HEW established a 30-day limit for the processing of
AFDC applications. U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, Welfare Adm'n, Bureau
of Family Services, Handbook of Public Assistance Administration, pt. IV, § 2200(b)
(3) (1968). Yet the agency made no attempt to secure compliance with this limit
from a state whose major city had a backlog of applications extending months beyond
the limit.
,50299 F. Supp. 336 (E.D. La. 1969), vacated & remanded, 397 U.S. 663 (1970).
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grant levels by ten percent, allegedly because of the increased costs of
5 1 increased the number of reits ADC program after King v. Smiths
cipients by invalidating the man-in-the-house rule. ADC recipients
immediately sought to enjoin Louisiana's action, arguing that section
402 (a) (23) precluded a state from reducing grant levels prior to July
1, 1969.2 In a supplemental action, the plaintiffs also sought a
declaratory judgment that section 402 (a) (23) required a state to increase benefits by July 1 commensurate with the increase in the cost
of living. The court held that the latter claim was premature because
the Louisiana legislature had not yet enacted an appropriations law
for the fiscal year beginning July 1 3 and the court could not say that
the state would not comply with the clause, whatever its meaning.
In deciding whether section 402 (a) (23) precluded reduction of
grant levels prior to July 1, the court adopted the position taken by
HEW in its amicus brief and held that whatever Congress may have
required by July 1, nothing in the legislative history suggested that
Congress meant to preclude reduction prior to that date.5 The court
concluded with a statement echoed in every subsequent decision adverse
to the recipients:
[W]e have considerable respect for [HEW's] interpretation
of the Social Security Act, since [it] is charged with the
responsibility of administering [the Act's] provisions. "When
faced with a problem of statutory construction, this Court
shows great deference to the interpretation given the statute
by the officers or agency charged with its administration." "
By adopting HEW's position the court assumed what it explicitly
denied having decided-that section 402 (a) (23) did not require an
increase in the amounts of benefits after July 1. For if section 402 (a)
(23) did require such an increase, congressional silence would certainly suggest that no decrease could be made prior to July 1.;6 Otherwise a state could reduce benefit levels so drastically that the percentage
increase after July 1 would not accurately reflect the higher cost of
living.
In any event, the case denied AFDC recipients judicial assistance
in securing state compliance with section 402 (a) (23) prior to July 1.
-1392 U.S. 309 (1968). The rule barred welfare payments to families in which
the parent either lived with or had continuous sexual relations with a member of the
opposite sex to whom he or she was not married.

52299 F. Supp. at 345.
63 Id. at 346.
54
d. at 344-45.
55
56

1d. at 345 (quoting Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965)).
d. at 348 (Cassibry, J., dissenting).
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Together with HEW's reluctance to apply any administrative pressure
towards compliance, this denial virtually assured that most states could
ignore the July 1 deadline with impunity.
On May 15, however, a district court judge in New York ruled
in Rosado v. Wyman " that section 402 (a) (23) barred a state from
decreasing benefit levels after July 1."
New York had planned to
change from a system that paid 100 percent of the standard of need
and grants for special needs to a flat grant system, in which benefits
were determined by computing the average amount payable to a family
of a given size. A single welfare recipient received $70.00 per month
under the new system; each of the first four children added $46.00
more, and each subsequent child, $43.00."o The fixed sum for each
family size was determined by finding the level of benefits paid to a
family with its eldest child at the mean age for that family size and
adjusted to equal the amount determined necessary for subsistence by
the federal government."
Grants for special needs were abolished.
This system reduced grants for those families with eldest children older
than the mean age and for some families losing special grants. Each
plaintiff alleged that her grant would be reduced under the new system
and argued that the statute was invalid under section 402 (a) (23),
claiming, as did the plaintiffs in Lampton I,1 that the provision required increases in the amounts of benefits to compensate for changes
in the cost of living.
After a comprehensive review of the legislative history, Judge
Weinstein agreed with Judge Cassibry's dissent in Lampton I: u the
statute was a nullity unless interpreted to prescribe increases in the
amounts of benefits.
No other court ruled on the statute prior to the July 1 deadline,
but on that date a three-judge federal district court in Jefferson v.
57304 F. Supp. 1356 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 414 F2d 170 (2d Cir. 1969), rev'd, 397
U.S. 397 (1970).
5
Three days earlier, a 3-judge court had found that recipients' concurrent challenge to the constitutionality of N.Y. Soc. SERvicEs LAW § 131-a (McKinney Supp.
1969), which imposed lower payment schedules for recipients living outside New York
City, no longer posed a justiciable issue in view of the enactment of a new provision,
§ 131 (a) (4), on May 9, 1969, potentially eliminating the inequality. Rosado v. Wyman,
304 F. Supp. 1354, 1356 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 414 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1969), rev'd, 397
U.S. 397 (1970).
M N.Y. Soc. SERvIcEs LAw § 131-a (McKinney Supp. 1969). The schedule of
payments given applied to the social services district of New York City. Payments
for the other districts were lower: $60.00 for the single recipient, $41.00 for each of
the first four children, and $33.00 for each subsequent child.
60 304 F. Supp. at 1367-69.
61
Text accompanying notes 52-53 .stpra.
62 The two judge majority in Lampton I held only that § 402 (a) (23) did not preclude reduction of benefits prior to July 1. See text accompanying notes 54-55 =pra.

1970]

WELFARE ADMINISTRATION

Hackney ' enjoined Texas from replacing the state's schedule of maximums with a percentage reduction system lowering grant levels by
fifty percent. The court's brief order stated that the change was
inconsistent with section 402 (a) (23).
At the first NWRO-HEW meeting after the Texas order, NWRO
pointed out that five federal judges-Cassibry in Louisiana, Weinstein
in New York, and the three-judge panel in Texas-had all rejected
HEW's position that the states could lower grant levels.'
NWRO
suggested that HEW withdraw its regulation or at least make known
its questionable status to the states that had not yet submitted plans.
HEW ignored the suggestion, indicating that recipients desiring relief
in other states would find it only in the courts."
HEW's failure to cooperate forced recipient groups in virtually
every state to find the financial resources and skilled attorneys necessary
to bring section 402 (a) (23) suits. A phalanx of welfare rights attorneys and organizations spearheaded the effort. 6 The difficulties involved cannot be overstated, however. A section 402 (a) (23) suit
posed complex jurisdictional questions " and often required bewildering computations for assessing the appropriateness of state adjustments
in grant levels."' Lacking adequate manpower and expertise in welfare
law, most legal services offices could not undertake such litigation without substantial outside assistance. And a number of summary dismissals in inadequately prepared cases might have jeopardized the
overall posture of section 402 (a) (23) litigation on its way to the
Supreme Court. These obstacles reinforced the inability of recipients
to marshal effective representation in litigation to compel state compliance.
Meanwhile, recipients suffered reverses in the states where litigation was actively pursued. On July 16, the three-judge district court
63304 F. Supp. 1332 (N.D. Tex. 1969) (3-judge court), vacated & remanded,
397 U.S. 821 (1970).
64
Each opinion specifically rejected the interpretation placed on § 402 (a) (23) by

HEW in 45 C.F.R. §233.20(a) (2) (ii) (1970).

105HEW maintained that discussion of the regulation's validity was futile, because
it would not withdraw the regulation unless a court so ordered. Note 33 .sepra.
06 The Center for Social Welfare Policy and Law at Columbia University played
a key role in developing the § 402(a) (23) litigation and worked with NWRO to
disseminate information to welfare attorneys, most of whom were from the OEO Legal
Services offices. Professor Edward V. Sparer of the University of Pennsylvania Law
School also played a leading role in both developing and disseminating legal strategy.
07 For an excellent discussion of the jurisdictional problems, see Note, Federal
JudicialReview of State Welfare Practices, 67 CoLuM. L. Rxv. 84 (1967).
65
First, many states determining benefit levels by administrative action are reluctant to disclose information. Second, even with the necessary information, changes
in formula were sometimes extremely difficult to correlate with past practices for
§ 402(a) (23) purposes. Finally, in addition to statistical vagueness, difficult problems
of evaluation arose in assessing, for example, the appropriateness of a 4% increase in
shelter allowance, a 6% increase in clothing allowance, and a 3% increase in food
allowance, all based on 1967 figures.
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in Louisiana reconsidered section 402 (a) (23) on the merits and held
in Lampton v. Bonin (Lampton II) 9 that the ratable reduction
enacted by the state, decreasing the amounts of benefits to recipients,
did not violate the provision. Judge Wisdom's majority opinion
recounted the legislative history, emphasized the inference to be drawn
from congressional silence, and concluded:
The construction HEW places on the statute tips the
scales in favor of the defendants. HEW is the agency charged
with administering the programs under the statute. And,
presumably, HEW sponsored or opposed the changes in the
Act that became the 1967 Amendments."
This last statement is ironic, because the provision HEW sponsored would have required the states not only to increase benefits but
also to pay 100 percent of need and to adjust standards of need
annually for cost-of-living changes."' I{EW's proposed amendment
was much more generous towards the recipients than its construction
of section 402 (a) (23), a construction that "tips the scales" in favor
of Louisiana's position.
On the same day in Rosado v. Wyman 7 the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit vacated Judge Weinstein's permanent injunction
against implementation of New York's revised schedule of AFDC
benefits. Both judges in the majority concurred in finding that Judge
Weinstein's order was an "abuse of discretion." " Chief Judge Lumbard summarized the majority's position:
[T]he federal claim seems more apt for initial resolution by
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, than by
the courts. The two issues upon a resolution of which this
claim turns-the practical effect of § 131-a [the contested
New York provision] and the proper construction of [402 (a)
(23) ] of the Social Security Act-both are exceedingly complex. The briefs and arguments of the parties, and the varying judicial views they have elicited, have demonstrated the
wisdom of allowing HEW, with its expertise in the operation
of the AFDC program and its experience in reviewing the
very technical provisions of state welfare laws, an initial opportunity to consider whether or not § 131-a is in compliance
with [402 (a) (23)]. .

.

. I believe that the district court

should have declined to exercise its jurisdiction, thus permitting HEW to determine the statutory claim asserted by
69304 F. Supp. 1384 (E.D. La. 1969).
'o Id. at 1389 (emphasis added).
7
1 Text accompanying note 10 supra.
72 414 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1969), rev'd, 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
73 Id. at 176 (Hays, J.) & 180 (Lombard, C. J.).
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plaintiffs, for the Department already had initiated review
proceedings concerning § 131-a.7-4
The district court abused its discretion because it took the case
before HEW exercised its primary jurisdiction; HEW must decide
initially whether a state's plan is satisfactory under section 402 (a) (23).
But recipients had already sought relief from HEW, only to become
convinced that effective relief to compel state compliance could be had
only in the courts. 5
Rosado ran aground on a more fundamental issue of judicialadministrative relations than that discussed in Jefferson v. Hackney or
either Lampton case. The latter cases dealt with the deference to be
accorded an administrative regulation interpreting a statutory provision.
But in Rosado the recipients also contended that by adopting a system
of flat grants New York reduced its standard of need and, consequently,
failed to comply even under HEW's interpretation of section 402 (a)
(23). Of course, HEW had not yet examined the details of the
New York plan. Thus the court had to determine the timeliness of
judicial intervention before considering the validity of the HEW regulation and the meaning of section 402 (a) (23).
Through Rosado the section 402 (a) (23) controversy finally
reached the Supreme Court. The majority per Justice Harlan accepted
the interpretation embodied in the HEW regulation. 76 In holding
that the provision compelled New York to adjust only its standard of
need, the Court found that
two broad purposes may be ascribed to § 402 (a) (23): First,
to require States to face up realistically to the magnitude of
the public assistance requirement and lay bare the extent to
which their programs fall short of fulfilling actual need;
second, to prod the States to apportion their payments on a
more equitable basis.7"
Both of these purposes are dubious. "To face up realistically" to the
public assistance burden presumes that AFDC eligibility should necessarily extend to all those families with incomes insufficient to pay for
their needs under the adjusted standard of need. But section 402 (a)
(23) did not clearly require the states to provide such an extension
of eligibility. Indeed, HEW approved the Texas plan contested in
Jefferson v. Hackney, although it pegged eligibility at the benefit level
7- Id. at 181.
75 Text accompanying notes 31-49 supra; see Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397,

406 n.8 (1970).
7
6 Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
77 Id. at 412-13.
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after reducing the standard of need by fifty percent. Further, in
speaking of forcing the states to "lay bare the extent to which their
programs fall short of fulfilling actual need," the Court prophesizes
a most improbable public reaction to inadequate benefit levels. Finally,
if the purpose of section 402 (a) (23) was to discourage states from
maintaining maximums, Congress certainly adopted a roundabout
means for achieving its objective.
Justice Black, joined by Chief Justice Burger in dissent, did not
dispute the majority's interpretation of section 402 (a) (23), but agreed
with the court of appeals that the statutory scheme required the federal
courts to abstain entirely until HEW completed its proceedings.
Ensuring that the federal courts have the benefit of HEW's
expertise in the welfare area is an important but by no means
the only consideration supporting the limitation of judicial
intervention at this stage. . . . [I]t will be impossible for
HEW to fulfill its function under the Social Security Act if
its proceedings can be disrupted and its authority undercut
by courts which rush to make precisely the same determination that the agency is directed by the Act to make...
[A]ll judicial examinations of alleged conflicts between state
and federal AFDC programs prior to a final HEW decision
approving or disapproving the state plan are fundamentally
inconsistent with the enforcement scheme created by Congress
and hence such suits should be completely precluded."8
The dissent in effect fashioned the lower court's holding-that HEW
should initially resolve the dispute over section 402 (a) (23)-into a
rule requiring judicial abstention in all cases in which HEW is charged
with administrative responsibility, at least under the AFDC program.
Refusing to accept this position, the majority considered section
402 (a) (23) on its merits. Under their reading of the provision, a
state may reduce AFDC benefit levels by adopting a system without
maximums, but must adjust its standard of need commensurate with
any increase in the cost of living. The majority accepted judge Weinstein's independent determination that New York had lowered its
standard of need, principally by the elimination of special need items
from recipients' budgets, and remanded the case to the district court
with instructions that an order was to be entered restraining the state
from receiving federal AFDC funds if it failed to adjust its standard
of need within a reasonable period of time.
Both defeat and victory for AFDC recipients, Rosado v. Wynuil 79
permits a state to enact a percentage reduction, as in Louisiana and
78

1d. at 434-35 (Black, J., & Burger, C. J., dissenting).

79 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
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Texas, yet affords recipients a judicial safeguard against administrative
recalcitrance.
VI.

SECTION

402(a) (23)

AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: AN APPRAISAL

Responding to the arguments of the dissenters, the majority in
Rosado stated that
neither the principle of "exhaustion of administrative remedies" nor the doctrine of "primary jurisdiction" has any application to the situation before us. Petitioners do not seek
review of an administrative order, nor could they have obtained an administrative ruling since HEW has no procedure
whereby welfare recipients may trigger and participate in the
Department's review of state welfare programs.'
But both the majority and the dissent evidenced little understanding
of the political context in which HEW makes its decisions. An effective judicial remedy requires a more sceptical attitude towards administrative expertise and independence. Although affirming the competence of the courts in cases like Rosado, the majority did not abandon
past notions of judicial deference to the administrative agencies.
That these formal doctrines of administrative law do not
preclude federal jurisdiction does not mean, however, that a
federal court must deprive itself of the benefit of the expertise
of the federal agency that is primarily concerned with these
problems. Whenever possible the district courts should obtain
the views of HEW in those cases where it has not set forth
its views, either in a regulation or published opinion, or in
cases where there is real doubt as to how the Department's
standards apply to the particular state regulation or program. 81
Ordinarily HEW will decide whether the AFDC program is
properly implemented, rather than allow the decision to pass to the
courts by default, as in Rosado. The willingness of the majority in
Rosado to decide what HEW left undecided does not guarantee that,
when HEW does take a position, judicial deference will be exercised
in proportion to demonstrated administrative competence. Judicial
timidity may yet triumph when the banner of administrative expertise
is waved. In view of this possibility, a reassessment of the resolution
of the controversy over the implementation of section 402 (a) (23) is
critical.
The court of appeals in Rosado left the recipients with no forum
in which they could effectively articulate their interests, unless they
80 Id.
at 406.
81

Id. at 406-07.
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directly attacked the validity of the HEW regulation. And, as
Lantpton II demonstrated, judicial deference to administrative expertise
seriously disadvantaged recipients even when a direct attack was
launched. If administrative expertise were meaningful, this deference
and its consequences might not be troublesome. But judicial reliance
on administrative expertise appears to have been misplaced. First,
agency expertise did not necessarily extend to the interpretation of
legislative history; indeed, in the present case, HEW apparently overlooked the most persuasive evidence supporting its position. Construing
legislative intent is a familiar judicial function, and deference to
HEW's interpretation was ill-advised.82
Second, even accepting HEW's interpretation of section 402 (a)
(23), reliance on HEW's expertise in analyzing and evaluating state
responses to the provision presupposed that the agency had secured
the relevant data and formulated criteria for its evaluation. HEW's
perception of its powerlessness vis-i-vis the states here becomes critical.
HEW did not take the initiative in compelling compliance with section
402 (a) (23) on any terms. HEW offered the states no guidelines
until three and one-half months after compliance was statutorily required, although it had eighteen months in which to act before the
provision became operative. Further, the guidelines ultimately issued
were so broad as to be virtually meaningless. A summer of face-to-face
negotiations similarly yielded no clear statement from HEW on what
criteria it would employ in assessing state compliance-let alone what
measures the Department would take to secure the necessary data
about state plans. The agency's expertise in such circumstances is
meaningless.
The problem can be viewed from another perspective. In recent
years, courts have exhibited an increasing concern for the effective
representation of diverse interests within the administrative decisionmaking process.'
The leading cases involve the major independent
federal regulatory agencies. In Scenic Hudson Preservation Conferference v. FPC, the court sustained a challenge by a conservation
82

The Supreme Court in Rosado did not view narrowly HEW's competence to
construe the provision:
While, in view of Congress' failure to track the Administration proposals and
its substitution without comment of the present compromise section, HEW's
construction commands less than the usual deference that may be accorded an
administrative interpretation based on its expertise, it is entitled to weight as
the attempt of an experienced agency to harmonize an obscure enactment with
the basic structure of a program it administers.
Id. at 415.
83 See generally Bonfield, Public Participationin Federal Rulemaking Relating to
Public Property, Loans, Grants,Benefits, or Contracts,118 U. PA. L. REv. 540 (1970) ;
Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look At Rulemaking and
Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 485 (1970).
84 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
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group to the FPC's determination that Consolidated Edison should
be granted a license to build an electric power storage facility on
Storm King Mountain on the banks of the Hudson River. The court
held that the FPC must demonstrate that it had considered the noneconomic as well as the economic consequences of its decision in determining the public interest.
In Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC'
the FCC granted a one-year probationary license to a television station
carrying racially discriminatory programming, but refused to allow
the United Church of Christ to intervene as a representative of the
listening public. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
held that the petition to intervene should have been granted, and
remanded the case to the FCC for a rehearing. Upon rehearing, the
FCC granted a three-year license (without probation) to the station.
In a second appeal,88 the court found that the FCC had virtually ignored
the earlier opinion's requirement to respect the intervenor's attempt to
represent the public interest, and revoked the license rather than remanding to the Commission.
At the heart of the present discussion is whether the legal system
is capable of adopting a more expansive view of the public interest and
opening its doors to claims of groups-welfare recipients, conservationists, consumers-traditionally unrepresented or under-represented in the
political decisionmaking process. Decisions such as Scenic Hudson
Preservation Conference and United Church of Christ need not be read
as transforming courts into superagencies. Although courts cannot
realistically substitute their judgment for that of administrators possessing both expertise and firsthand familiarity with issues of fact and
policy, they can steadfastly refuse to be swayed by exaggerated notions
of agency competence. HEW's political vulnerability neutralized any
special competence it may have had to interpret section 402 (a) (23).
Beyond the question of statutory interpretation, if HEW is unwilling
or unable to compel even the most basic compliance with the law, the
judiciary must fill the breach rather than defer to a nonexistent, or
at least nonfunctioning, expertise.
Reinforcing the judicial concern that conflicting interests be effectively represented in the decisionmaking process is the well-documented
87
tendency of regulators to adopt the perspective of the regulated.
There is no reason to think that this "captive" phenomenon is limited
to the independent regulatory agencies. This Article has demonstrated
85 359 F2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
86 Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 F2d 543
(D.C. Cir. 1969).
8T
See, e.g., L. KOHL EER, THF REGULATORS 69-82 (1969).
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that an executive department can adopt a perspective on compliance
identical to that of the party legally bound to comply with its directives.
In the context of HEW's interpretation and enforcement of section
402 (a) (23), judicial respect for administrative independence of judgment-like judicial respect for administrative expertise-was largely an
unexamined reliance on an empty shibboleth. Hopefully courts will
show the same healthy scepticism toward positive acts of administrative
implementation that the Rosado Court showed towards HEW's pattern
of "implementation" by default.
Politically powerless groups will continue to seek redress in the
courts.'s

Courts cannot escape political involvement by the mechanical

application of judicial doctrines relating to judicial control of administrative action."" Political involvement is inevitable, and courts should
exercise their power to secure effective implementation of the law.
88 NWRO recently challenged HEW's continued funding of AFDC plans in states
failing to comply with § 402(a) (23). It argued that 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1964) empowered HEW to make payments only to states with approved plans satisfying the
conditions specified in § 402(a). Thus, states ignoring § 402(a) (23) failed to fulfill
the necessary requirements. See NWRO Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion
to Dismiss, NWRO v. Finch, No. 2954-69 (Jan. 14, 1970).
89 An independent judicial construction of § 402(a) (23) would be less politically
motivated than a construction based on administrative "expertise" reflecting political
pressure rather than technical competence. Moreover, judicial deference to agency
inaction sanctions state lawlessness and hence is as "political" as judicial activism.
Although a court cannot compel a state to appropriate more funds to the AFDC
program, it can enjoin a state from receiving federal funds until it makes the necessary
appropriations. See Jefferson v. Hackney, 304 F. Supp. 1332 (N.D. Tex. 1969)
(3-judge court), vacated on other grounds & remanded, 397 U.S. 821 (1970).

